We investigate the effects of price discrimination on prices, profits, and consumer surplus when (a) at least one competing firm can use consumers' private information to price discriminate yet (b) consumers can prevent such use by paying a "privacy cost". Unlike a monopolist, competing duopolists do not always benefit from a higher privacy cost because each firm's profit decreases-and consumer surplus increases-with that cost. Under such competition, the optimal strategy for an owner of consumer data that sells information in a single block is selling to only one firm, thereby maximizing the stakes for rival buyers. The resulting inefficiencies imply that policy makers should devote more attention to discouraging exclusivity deals and less to ensuring that consumers can easily protect their privacy.
Introduction
This paper studies how customer information and privacy affect the price-targeting behavior in online markets of a firm under imperfect competition. We investigate the effects of price discrimination on prices, profits, and consumer surplus when firms can use consumers' private information to price-discriminate and when consumers are given the means to prevent that discrimination. Our analysis yields some interesting conclusions regarding the value of customer information-in other words, the willingness to pay of firms that seek data about potential customers.
In the past several years, price discrimination on the Internet has been documented many times.
1 An especially (in)famous case occurred in 2000 when a customer complained that, after erasing the "cookies" recently, the Wall Street Journal (2012a) reported that the travel agency Orbitz Worldwide was showing more expensive hotel offers to Mac users than to PC users. A similar practice has been employed by Staples.com:
the Wall Street Journal (2012b) revealed that this site displayed different prices once the potential buyers' locations had been identified. Other firms using customers' browsing history and geolocation to vary the offers and products were identified by the newspaper: Discover Financial Services, Rosetta Stone, Home
Depot and Office Depot.
The use of data in marketing is not a new phenomenon. Maintaining a customer database and conducting market research have long been staples of every business activity. However, technical progress and the digitalization of the economy have expanded the nature (e.g., real-time location data fed by smartphones), sources (e.g., cross-device tracking of a user's Web journey), applications (e.g., machine learning) and volume of data. The widespread use of personal data in marketing has thus created an immense demand for consumers' personal information, which in turn has spawned a data brokers industry generating an estimated $156 billion (US) annually. Some of these brokers are large data aggregators; others specialize in specific types of consumers (Pasquale, 2014) . Examples of such data intermediaries include Acxiom, BlueKai (Oracle), Experian, and Teradata. These firms collect data from a variety of sources, including their own data collection technology, arrangements with website owners allowing the intermediary to implement user tracking technologies (such as cookies and pixels), public information (phone numbers, information available on social networks), data from public authorities and third-party companies (websites, banks, other data brokers).
Our aim in this paper is to study the role of information and privacy in markets, with a particular emphasis on online markets. More precisely, we would like to understand the value of consumer information-both for the sellers of this information and for the firms that buy it. We also study whether consumers should be given more or less control over the information that can be used by firms to adjust their commercial offers.
Since little is known empirically about the contracts written between the intermediary data sellers and the buyers of such data, in this paper we employ a theoretical framework. In order to set grounds for our research question and modeling approach, imagine two differentiated retailers that are competing against each other to supply sport shoes to customers who shop online. Call these companies Adidas and Nike.
Adidas and Nike can both approach a data broker that holds unique information about some customers who are interested in shoes. There are several questions we aim to answer: a) How would Nike price its shoes once it has bought some detailed profiles from the data supplier? b) How does Nike's pricing strategy depend on whether Adidas also possesses detailed profiles about some customers? c) How do customers,
given that price targeting requires access to customers' profiles, protect their information? d) Will the data supplier be better-off selling the database to only one retailer or to both Adidas and Nike? After answering these questions, we will be able to conduct a welfare analysis pertaining to these related policy questions: e)
How are the various parties affected when it is made easier or more difficult for customers to conceal their information (i.e., when privacy costs vary)? f) Should data exclusivity contracts be allowed or instead be challenged by the relevant authorities?
Preview of the model
To answer these questions, we build a model in which firms can first acquire from an intermediary information on consumers' tastes and then offer their products at a set of different personalized prices. We assume that there are two broad groups of consumers, which we call "new" and "old" consumers. For the first group, individual information cannot be extracted (we use here the standard Hotelling model of differentiated products). For the second group, information may be available-that is, for purchase from a data supplier.
In our setting, the first group can be thought of as offline consumers and online consumers who are not yet active because they are newcomers; the second group consists of consumers who are active, leave many traces of their activities that can be collected by the data broker, and so must engage ex post in costly actions to erase those traces. Active consumers can protect their privacy by paying a cost to "disappear" from the firm's database. We interpret this privacy cost as the effort consumers spend to conceal their actions online.
So, if a firm does not know a consumer's type even after paying for information, then it cannot tell whether this consumer is a less active consumer or rather an active one who erased his browsing history.
As a benchmark, we consider the case where privacy is not allowed and so information on all old consumer preferences is available on a data exchange market. A monopolist will fully exploit this situation and extract all surplus from each old consumer while behaving as a standard uninformed monopolist for new consumers. Under duopoly, the outcome depends on the informational structure-that is, on which firms acquire information about old consumers. We show that, as long as the data set is sold in one block, the data broker chooses to sell the data about consumers to only one firm. Then the uninformed firm sets a price lower than the Hotelling price and the informed firm pursues new consumers less aggressively. With regard to those old consumers, the informed firm will match what they could gain by buying from the other firm but will not capture the entire market.
We then study the case where consumers can pay for privacy and thus avoid being in the database. Here, too, there exist two de facto markets: one with the new consumers and all the old consumers who paid the privacy cost, and one containing only old consumers who chose not to pay the privacy cost. On the first or anonymous market, a monopolist sets a price that is increasing in the number of old consumers in this market or, equivalently, that is decreasing in the cost of privacy. On the second market, this firm captures all of the consumer surplus. A higher privacy cost benefits new consumers but makes old consumers in the anonymous market worse-off; however, the monopolist's profit always increases with the privacy cost. In the duopoly case, as long as the data set is sold in one block, we show that the data supplier still chooses to deal exclusively with one firm and that the price of information is U-shaped with respect to the privacy cost.
Investigating market prices in this case reveals that prices on the anonymous market will be higher than in the Hotelling case and will decline as the privacy cost increases. Indeed, for a small privacy cost, most old consumers choose to buy on the anonymous market. The uninformed firm can therefore obtain a large profit by focusing on this market and setting a high price. If the privacy cost increases then the size and the taste characteristics of consumers on the anonymous market change, which makes both firms more aggressive. In this setting, larger privacy costs increase competition; hence both firms' individual profits are decreasing in the privacy cost and consumer surplus is increasing in that cost.
Finally, we extend our analysis in different directions, related to timing, selling strategies, and markets size. First, we show that our main analysis is robust to a change of timing where consumers can pay for privacy after prices have been set. In this case, consumers pay the same total price (including the privacy cost) as in the benchmark case but firms are able to increase their profit by de facto capturing the privacy cost, since no one hides. Second, and still related to timing, we relax the assumption that the data supplier can commit ex ante to a particular selling strategy. Despite this change, we still find that the data broker chooses to sell information exclusively to one firm.
In the second main extension, we allow the data supplier to use more subtle selling strategies by considering two alternative options. This extension is all the more important since little is known about the actual contracting agreements between the data brokers and their clients. We first discuss the possibility of splitting the data set into two parts, and selling each part to a different firm. We show that this way to partition the data set may indeed increase the profit of the data supplier. Next, we consider the possibility that, on top of selling the full data set to one firm, the data supplier sells a less precise version to the rival firm. We show that, if the data seller can choose the level of precision of the second data set, it should optimally be as imprecise as possible, implying that in this case the optimal strategy for the data supplier is still to sell the whole data set exclusively.
The final extension investigates the case where the market sizes of old and new consumers differ. We show that varying these relative sizes changes firms' pricing strategies, with greater competition evident when the (relative) mass of new consumers is small, but our result of exclusive dealing on the data market is still robust.
Literature
Privacy is a long-standing topic in economics. Several decades ago, Stigler (1980) and Posner (1981) argued that privacy could reduce economic efficiency by allowing individuals to hide some characteristics. The disclosure of information, and the price discrimination that follows (as shown by Thisse and Vives, 1988) , are known to have different effects. Disclosure can increase welfare in that the firm can then sell to consumers with lower valuations (the welfare effect of price discrimination, see Tirole, 1988) . Ex ante, however, early information disclosure renders insurance impossible and thus hinders efficient risk sharing (Hirshleifer, 1971) . We shall assume that the market is always fully covered and so price discrimination affects only the distribution of surplus among the agents-in other words, it has no direct effect on efficiency. We can still conduct a meaningful welfare analysis because our model incorporates both transportation costs and privacy costs; hence the privacy factors of interest continue to generate tangible economic trade-offs.
Given the recent rise of online markets and Big Data, privacy research has been revived along three main directions.
3 The first of these is research addressing behavior-based price discrimination (see e.g., Villas-Boas 1999; Fudenberg and Tirole, 2000; Villas-Boas, 2004; Esteves, 2010; Fudenberg and Villas-Boas, 2012) . 4 These papers explore dynamic pricing situations where competition is repeated and where firms use the past behavior of consumers to infer their tastes and then price accordingly. If each consumer is biased toward one particular firm, then consumers' first-period choices show who is a fan of which firm. This revelation leads firms to set high prices for their fans but low prices for the fans of the other firms.
Our model differs from the literature on behavior-based price discrimination in that we do not assume a period in which there is no information. That we abstract from the process of creating information allows us to extend the research questions in several directions, focusing first on the privacy actions undertaken by consumers and then on how this information is sold to retail firms. Also, we explicitly have in mind situations where retail firms, despite having repeated interactions with their customers, are unable to infer much about them directly so they need to buy additional information and analytics services from a data seller. In turn, a data seller might have collected information about customers in the past and matched both online and offline information, in order to create a mapping of consumer preferences about all those "old" consumers who left digital traces but did not protect their identities. 5 An unprotected old consumer will therefore face a targeted price and will not have access to the offers that the same firm may have for other consumers. This assumption is at the very core of the idea of price-discrimination and has been used in many contexts. 6 In the behavior-based price discrimination literature, consumers make implicit privacy 3 For a comprehensive review of the literature on the economics of privacy, see Acquisti et al. (2016) . See also Lane et al. (2014) for an accessible approach to policy issues. For empirical work on privacy, see Tucker (2011, 2012) . 4 The marketing literature on advertising, couponing, market segmentation, and consumer addressability is closely related (see Chen et al., 2001; Chen and Iyer, 2002; Shen and Villas-Boas, 2017) .
5 Another example could be an Internet service provider, such as Verizon, that is capable of assembling a complete picture of any consumer by using its network to track the sites that the consumer visits. Similarly, a broadband service like Google Fiber could blend consumer information with search, maps and email habits of a consumer. The US Federal Communications Commission is now considering whether to ban firms from engaging in such practices without the consumer's permission (see Kang, 2016) .
6 For example, in Chen (1999) local shoppers always buy from the same retailer and do not compare prices; in Fudenberg and Tirole (2000) firms offer promotional prices to attract new consumers, which are unaccessible to loyal shoppers; in Villas-Boas (2004) the seller chooses a price for returning shoppers, who do not have access to other prices; in Acquisti and Varian (2005) consumers observe a discriminatory price if the seller identifies a cookie in the customer's browser; in Armstrong (2006) firms choices when they decide whether or not to buy from a firm at an initial stage. Our paper makes this choice and its related cost explicit. In both cases, the firm is able to make a personalized offer to consumers who already bought the product and a potentially distinct offer to consumers who did not.
The second strand of this literature has tackled the privacy issue more directly. Taylor (2004) and Acquisti and Varian (2005) consider repeated sales by a monopolist in each period while assuming that tastes are intertemporally correlated. Both papers show that using past information can benefit a firm with myopic but not with rational consumers. Following the Coase (1972) conjecture argument, using past information deters consumers from consuming in the first place and thus reduces the firm's profit. So far there has been only limited analysis of information disclosure in a more competitive setting; a notable exception is Taylor and Wagman (2014) , who show that-depending on the details of the model used-full privacy can be detrimental to consumer welfare. 7 We endogenize the consumer privacy choice and also insist that the data owner follow its optimal selling strategy, a combination that has not been analyzed before in the privacy literature.
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The third strand of the literature shares with our paper the idea that consumers may decide how much information to reveal. In Conitzer et al. (2012) and Koh et al. (2017) consumers can choose the amount of personal data they reveal to competing firms and product quality is increasing in the amount of this information. Their model also features firms that derive revenue from selling consumer data as well as consumers who value privacy. In contrast, we separate the market for goods and the market for information; we also model differently the manner in which consumers choose their privacy. Chen et al. (2001) shed some light on the market for information. In their model, firms compete to attract nonloyal customers. These authors find that a data broker may be incentivized to sell data nonexclusively if can use marketing data to set higher prices to consumers who prefer their brand. Additionally, see Stole (2007) for examples of price discrimination identified in the literature. In a digital context, Ezrachi and Stucke (2016) argue that a good approximation to first-degree price discrimination can be achieved by the so-called "personal digital butlers", such as Apple's Siri or Amazon's Alexa. The more the consumer relies on the butler, the less likely she will be aware of this discrimination. Even if she searches the web herself, the ads, products, or search results she sees may be orchestrated by the butler. 7 See also Liu and Serfes (2006) , Chen and Zhang (2011) , and Shy and Stenbacka (2016) . 8 A related literature is that on intermediary gatekeepers; see Pancras and Sudhir (2007) , and Weeds (2016) .
targetability (the firm's ability to distinguish loyal from nonloyal consumers) is sufficiently low. This result runs counter to ours and will be discussed later (see Section 4.2).
Finally, our paper is also related to the literature on information acquisition in oligopolistic markets. At an early stage, this literature focused mainly on aggregate information, such as common demand parameters (see Ponssard, 1979; Vives, 1984; Gal-Or, 1985) . The literature later shifted towards consumers' information acquisition through repeated interactions (as in the research previously cited), or by testing individual consumers (Burke et al., 2012) . In contrast, we allow for individual information to be acquired from a third party. Moreover, consumers can individually protect their personal data; this results in an endogenous information structure and hence in an endogenous object that can be traded.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model, and in Section 3 we solve the case where consumers are not allowed to have privacy. Section 4 introduces endogenous privacy, and
Section 5 details three extensions of the model. We conclude the paper in Section 6 by discussing our results and offering suggestions for future research.
The model
There are three different types of agents: consumers, two competing retail firms, and a data supplier that can collect information about consumers. We start by describing the preferences of consumers and the two competing firms. There is a continuum of customers each of whom has unit demand. A customer receives utility v > 0 from buying the product but nothing otherwise. Consumers have horizontal preferences θ that are uniformly distributed on [0, 1] . Let p i be the price charged by firm i for its product (i = A, B). Each firm's marginal cost is normalized to 0. In addition, consumers must pay a linear transportation cost t > 0 in order to buy the good. So if firm i is located at point x ∈ [0, 1], then consumer θ derives net utility v − p i − |x − θ|t. When two firms compete on the market, consumers buy from the one that gives them the greatest utility. We assume throughout that v ≥ 2t; thus we ensure that the gross utility is high enough that all consumers would consume even if the price were set by a monopolist seller.
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Suppose there are two sets of consumers (each like the set just described) but differing in terms of the information on consumer preferences obtainable by firms. We refer to the first set as the new consumers.
Because there is no way to obtain detailed information about them, firms can offer only basic or uniform prices that do not depend on θ. The second set consists of what we call old consumers. A firm may be able to obtain information on these consumers, which would allow it to make tailored offers that depend on θ in a way that we will specify. The total mass of each set is normalized to unity. We set c ≤ t throughout, which generates the economically more interesting cases (since it can be easily shown that, when c > t, no consumer would ever pay the privacy cost). We assume that c has a direct effect on utility: if a consumer θ buys the good at p i from a firm located at x and also pays the privacy cost, then his utility is v − p i − |x − θ|t − c. Hereafter, c will not depend on the consumer type; hence we can explore more generally the effects of policies that facilitate or impede privacy on the Internet.
Firm i can price its product differently for the two groups. A basic price will be offered to all consumers that i does not recognize; call that the anonymous market. This group consists of all new consumers plus those old consumers who paid the privacy cost and so cannot be detected. The basic price will be based on the firm's belief about the average willingness to pay in the anonymous market.
For consumers it does recognize, the firm will make tailored offers based on each consumer's location θ.
The consumers on this personalized market are simply the old consumers who chose not to pay the privacy cost. Figure 1 represents a case where old consumers with locations between 0 and θ 2 paid the privacy cost and therefore cannot be recognized. Hence, the anonymous market comprises these consumers plus every 10 The same analysis could be made with variable costs, that would depend on the level of effort chosen by every consumer as a function of the gain they expect from being private.
11 As in Europe, for example (see Directive 2002/58/EC). 12 Firms could also facilitate privacy voluntarily. For example the Network Advertising Initiative (an association of advertisers) encourages its members to offer opt-out provisions so that consumers can more easily avoid being tracked and targeted. However, there is evidence that some participants do not respect consumers' opt-out choices (Mayer, 2012) . The last agent in our model is the data supplier, a broker who collects and sells data about consumer preferences. This information can be viewed as personal taste, willingness to pay, brand fidelity, and so on.
We assume that the data supplier is a monopolist, in that it possesses unique information related to specific customer profiles. We do not model how it acquires its supply of data because we are more interested in how it chooses to sell the data and how the data are used by retailers. Data brokers collect and store a vast amount of data on almost every household and commercial transaction in the US. The Federal Trade
Commission (FTC) recently surveyed the US landscape, and found a concentrated market structure, which is not surprising given the economies of scale associated with Big Data analytics. According to the FTC, one data broker's database has information on 1.4 billion consumer transactions and over 700 billion aggregated data elements; another broker's database covers $1 trillion in consumer transactions; and yet another adds 3 billion new records each month to its databases (FTC, 2014) . This information is then sold to retail firms. For instance, BlueKai supplies centralized information (on consumers' past experience and observed characteristics) that is then auctioned to retailers (BlueKai, 2015) .
However, consumers are not passive and can take actions to avoid appearing in the database. There are many reasons to do so. First, privacy is a good in itself, and many consider it unethical for a company to compile personal information. Second, some people may wish to conceal criminal or shameful activities.
Third, consumers might be aware that firms can set different prices for different customers based on personal data. It is this aspect of such information that our model incorporates. 13 In our model, it is not a question of the unprotected consumer not knowing what the non-tailored price is. Indeed, all old consumers correctly anticipate the non-tailored price (even observe it; see the extension in Section 5.1.1.). Every consumer is fully rational in our model. But there is no way for the unprotected consumer to avail of the non-tailored price when consuming online. In this respect, c can be understood either as the cost of being protected online, or as the cost of accessing the non-tailored price if the good is also sold offline.
14 13 We emphasize that the only reason for paying the privacy cost in our model is because a tailored price is expected to be higher than the basic price for a particular consumer θ; thus we do not include any intrinsic benefits of privacy. However, c could also be viewed as a net privacy cost that includes an intrinsic value for privacy.
14 We thank a referee for making this point.
As a benchmark, we first study the case where consumers cannot pay for privacy. This is identical to saying that the cost c is extremely high. First we analyze the monopoly case, followed by the case where two firms compete. In this section, the set of new consumers is equivalent to the anonymous market and the set of old consumers to the personalized market; hence we use the respective terms interchangeably. 15 Throughout, we solve for perfect Bayesian equilibria in pure strategies.
Monopoly
Consider a monopolist seller (denoted as firm i) located at 0 with respect to both sets of consumers (old and new).
16 The model's timing proceeds as follows:
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Stage 1. The data supplier posts a price T for the data.
Stage 2. Firm i decides whether or not to purchase the data.
Stage 3. Firm i determines its basic price p i .
Stage 4. Firm i can offer tailored prices.
Stage 5. Consumers buy and consume.
We assume that the monopolist bought the information from the data broker at stage 2. The monopolist's market share among new consumers is then all the consumers θ ∈ [0, θ 1 ] such that v − p − θ 1 t = 0. This means that θ 1 represents a consumer who is indifferent between buying the good and taking the outside option, which he values at zero:
For the old consumers, the firm offers prices p(θ) tailored to each θ. Since the outside option is assumed equal to 0, it follows that the tailored prices can be as high as needed to capture all the surplus. Therefore,
here v ≥ 2t > t guarantees that p(θ) > 0. Hence, the monopolist solves
15 This will not be the case in Section 4, which incorporates privacy. 16 The results of this section would be qualitatively similar if the firm were located in the middle of each market. 17 Merging stages 3 and 4 would make no difference in this case, but we keep them distinct for consistency with the competition case to be analyzed in Section 3.2.
Given our assumption v ≥ 2t, we obtain p * = v − t and θ 1 = 1. The price p * is the equilibrium basic price and is offered only to new consumers. Old consumers are offered the tailored price p(θ) and are left with no surplus. These results imply that both markets are fully covered.
Total profits π are given by the sum of the profits π O obtained from selling to old consumers and the profits π N from selling to new consumers. The respective equilibrium values are
Hence total profits are π = 2v − 3t/2. Note that without information on consumers the monopolist's profit is 2(v − t)-that is, twice π N . As a result, the maximum price T * that a retailer will pay for this data set is
The consumer surplus (CS) for old consumers and new consumers is given by
respectively. These expressions imply that total consumer surplus is simply CS = CS N = t/2.
Competition
We now study the case where two firms, A and B, compete. We assume that their locations are fixed with respect to all consumers, with firm A located at θ = 0 and firm B at θ = 1. We look at different cases depending on which firms have information about consumers. As in Section 3.1, information is available only about old consumers and no information can be obtained about new consumers. The timing in the competitive case is the same as in Section 3.1, for firm i = {A, B}.
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In stage 2, firms can buy information from an upstream data supplier. We assume that this is the only stage at which information can be sold. In other words, the data supplier's stage 1 commitment to the price T is ex ante-that is, prior to the retailers' purchase decisions.
As a benchmark, consider the case in which neither firm has information. This is equivalent to solving a Hotelling model in two identical markets. In each market, the prices p A and p B are both equal to the transportation cost t; this implies that the market is evenly split between firms.
19 Then each firm's profits from selling to old and new consumers are t/2 while total profits for each firm are π A = π B = t.
Finally, for each consumer type the surplus is given by
Therefore, total consumer surplus CS = 2v − 5t/2.
Both firm A and firm B have information
The case in which both firms have purchased consumer information is studied by Taylor and Wagman (2014) .
The only difference is that we consider two sets of consumers and two types of prices.
Proposition 1. Assume that both firms A and B buy the information and that consumers cannot pay for privacy. Then the basic prices are p A = t and p B = t while the tailored prices are
Profits are π A = π B = 3t/4 and consumer surplus is given by CS = 2(v − t).
Proof. See Taylor and Wagman (2014) .
As compared with the no-information case, profits decrease while consumers' surplus increases. The reason is that competition reduces the potential for rent extraction when both firms have information about consumers; it is as if both firms were competingà la Bertrand for each consumer. Because the goods are differentiated, both prices are set at the marginal cost (here equal to 0) only for the consumers who is equidistant from both firms. For all other consumers, one of the two firms is preferred; hence that firm can set a strictly positive price and still sell its products.
Only firm A has information
Here, we focus on the case where information is sold to one firm only; we assume, without loss of generality, that it is firm A. In this case the consumer's outside option is not zero; 20 rather, it is the utility associated with buying from B instead of from A. Buying from A leads to the utility level
whereas buying from B leads to
here p A and p B are the prices that firm A and firm B charge for their respective products. In the anonymous market, the market shares [0, θ 1 ] and [θ 1 , 1] are determined by the indifferent consumer's choice between buying from A or B:
In the personalized market, firm A offers (at stage 4) a tailored price p A (θ) that leaves consumers indifferent between accepting and buying B's product. 21 As a consequence,
We define the last consumer buying from A by θ 0 2 , which is such that p A (θ 0 2 ) = 0. Using the expression just displayed for p A (θ), we obtain
Next we consider the game's third stage at which both firms choose their basic prices. Firm A's profits are given by
and B's profits are
There are two possible cases. In the first, B's price p B is low enough to attract some old consumers; this corresponds to when θ 0 2 < 1. If instead θ 0 2 ≥ 1, then firm B does not operate in the personalized market. In either case, A's reaction function is the same because p A (θ) does not depend on p A . The implication is that firm B must determine the game's outcome based on its own profits. In other words, firm B can choose either to lose every customer in the personalized market by setting a high price or to lower its price and thus keep some consumers in this market.
Our next proposition shows that, in this benchmark case with equal market sizes, 22 firm B finds it optimal to operate in the personalized market and therefore chooses a low basic price.
Proposition 2. Assume that only firm A buys the information and that consumers cannot pay for privacy.
21 Under indifference, consumers buy from the informed firm (which we are assuming is firm A). 22 In Section 5.2, we study the case where the market sizes can differ.
Then the equilibrium prices on the anonymous market are
profits are π A = 54t 49 and π B = 25t 49 ;
and consumer surplus is given by CS = 2v − 110t/49.
Proof. We verify that firm B finds it profitable to set a price such that it operates in the personalized market
2 . If B decides to compete in the personalized market then its reaction function will be the solution of arg max
. Combining this with A's reaction function yields p A = 6t/7 and p B = 5t/7
as well as respective profits for A and B of π A = 54t/49 and π B = 25t/49. If firm B does not operate in the personalized market, then its program can be written as arg max
Firm B's reaction function is then given by the standard Hotelling reaction function, p B (p A ) = t+p A 2 , which results in a price p B = p A = t and in profits of π B = t/2. Because this latter profit is smaller than the former, B chooses a price to compete both in the personalized market and in the anonymous market.
We find that prices are lower here than in the no-information case. As a result, consumer surplus is at its highest when both firms have consumer information and at its lowest when neither firm has such information.
We find that the informed firm is more profitable than an uninformed competitor. Moreover, the informed firm makes higher profits in this case than in any of the previous cases.
The price of information
We can now analyze how the value of information under the various setups studied in Section 3.2 should affect the data broker's selling strategy. Here we suppose that this data supplier (DS) owns the information about old consumers and can post a price T for it and sell it at stage 2, but only at that stage. The DS can choose different selling strategies by setting different prices, which in equilibrium will induce either one or both firms to buy the data. Note that we restrict here our attention to the case when the data set is sold in one block. 23 We use T k to denote the price paid by each firm when a number k of firms buys the information. The allocation and payments happen at stage 2, and we further assume that this trade is common knowledge.
If we suppose that DS chooses a strategy to maximize its profit, then this profit is given by
To characterize the prices T 1 and T 2 , we assume that DS has all the bargaining power; this is a natural assumption given that firms A and B are both competing. The setting is similar to an auction with externalities, as in Jehiel and Moldovanu (2000) . Indeed, suppose first that DS sells to only one firm. Then the maximum price T 1 that DS can set is the difference between winning and losing the auction for one firm's profits-that is, the firm's profits when it has consumer information minus the firm's profits when its rival has that information. In this first case we obtain
Analogously, if DS sells to both firms then T 2 represents the difference in (say) firm A's profit between the case when both firms can use consumer information and that when only firm B can use this information.
Plugging in the profit values derived previously, we obtain
Therefore, DS chooses to sell the information only to one firm because T 1 > 2T 2 . The next proposition formalizes this section's main result.
Proposition 3. Information is sold to only one firm at T 1 = 29t/49 and the firms' net profits are π A = π B = 25t/49.
Proof. See the text.
Proposition 3 establishes that it is optimal for the owner of information to grant only exclusive rights over the full database. The reason is that competition is too intense when both firms have information and the potential for rent extraction is minimized. That being said, an informed firm can extract more rents from consumers if its competitor must set a single basic price. The exclusive allocation can be implemented via an auction under which the DS commits to selling the data to only one firm.
We now turn to the case where consumers can pay for privacy. As noted in the description of our model, any consumer can incur a cost c so that he does not appear in the database. We assume that consumers can observe which firm(s) purchased this information and can form rational expectations about prices.
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Monopoly
We continue to assume that the monopolist is located at θ = 0 with respect to both new and old consumers.
The timing here is the same as in Section 3.1 except for the addition of a stage at which consumers can protect their privacy. This new stage 2.5 occurs just after the firm decides whether or not to buy the data:
Stage 2.5. Consumers make their privacy choice; that is, they decide whether or not to pay the cost c.
As in the case with no privacy, any consumer who is located at θ and for whom the firm has information will be charged the tailored price p(θ) = v − tθ > 0 and will derive zero utility. This group is called the personalized market, and it consists solely of the old consumers who did not opt for privacy; all other consumers constitute the anonymous market. Because each consumer's privacy choice is made at stage 2.5 (i.e., before any price has been set), we need to define an anticipated price p a ≥ 0. This is the basic price that old consumers expect to pay if they are not in the firm's database. In effect, for these consumers the total price is now p a + c. To the extent that consumers anticipate a higher price, fewer pay to avoid detection.
However, if p a + c remains small, then consumers would have an incentive to opt for privacy at stage 2.5. A consumer located at θ will pay the privacy cost when
To solve the model, assume that the firm buys consumer information at stage 2. Then, at stage 3, the monopolist maximizes profits π(p) given the anticipated p a :
The first term on the right-hand side (RHS) represents the profits from selling to new consumers, and the second term represents the profits from the old consumers who have paid the privacy cost. Together, these two terms capture the firm's profits on the anonymous market. Observe that the firm could set a high enough price p that the actual market share θ 1 is exceeded by the proportion of consumers who are willing to pay the privacy cost. This is why the upper bound in the second integral is min{θ 1 , θ 2 }. The last term on the RHS represents the personalized market; consumers in this market are subject to price discrimination and pay the tailored price p(θ).
The firm then maximizes the profits expressed in equation (1) for p ≥ 0 subject to the following constraint:
Furthermore, in any equilibrium we require that the proportion of consumers who pay the privacy cost remain bounded:
Proposition 4. Suppose the firm buys the consumer information.
then not all new consumers buy the product, with
while profits and consumer surplus are, respectively,
(ii) If t ≥ c > 3t − v, then all new consumers buy the product, with Proof. Note that θ 2 > θ 1 cannot be an equilibrium because consumers at stage 2.5 correctly anticipate the prices chosen by the monopolist at stage 3 and so p a = p. Then in any equilibrium we must have θ 2 ≤ θ 1 .
Under this condition, the firm takes the quantity of consumers who pay the privacy cost θ 2 as given. If we neglect conditions (2) and (3), then the first-order condition π (p) = 0 leads to
We finally apply rational expectations, under which p a = p, and solve for p. Observe that if p a = p then θ 1 ≤ 1 implies θ 2 ≤ 1. In this case, the solution requires only that θ 1 ≤ 1 be interior. The second solution is the corner solution when θ 1 = 1.
The basic price p * is now obtained by assessing the average willingness to pay in the anonymous market, which corresponds to the weighted average between the willingness to pay of new consumers and the willingness to pay of old consumers who have already paid a privacy cost c. Note also that the average willingness to pay of those who paid the privacy cost is greater than the average willingness to pay of new consumers-given that consumers who pay that cost are located closer to the firm. Thus we found that if c increases then p * decreases (because fewer consumers choose privacy) which reduces the demand for the firm's product owing to a lower average valuation. Proof. The claims follow directly from the relevant expressions in Proposition 4.
Corollary 1 states that profits are increasing in the privacy cost. Profits increase in c because, notwithstanding the lower basic price, a smaller proportion of consumers pay the privacy cost. Then higher profits in the personalized market compensate the firm for its losses in the anonymous market.
Consider first the interior case c ≤ 3t−v, where consumers' surplus is U-shaped in c. This pattern reflects that new consumers always gain with a larger c whereas old consumers always lose. For new customers, a larger cost is associated with a larger market share for the firm and a lower price; the opposite holds for old customers. This can be seen by observing that the effective basic price paid by old consumers is p * + c.
Corollary 1 states that the losses from old consumers (resp., the gains from new consumers) dominate when c ≤ v/5 (resp., when c > v/5).
If instead c > 3t − v, then increasing c has no effect on the set of new consumers because full coverage is achieved; hence the firm no longer lowers its price on the anonymous market. Then, when c increases, the surplus of old consumers declines as fewer consumers pay for privacy and hence must pay their full valuation.
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As in the case without privacy, the data supplier can extract any profit the monopolist makes in excess of 2(v − t)-which are the profits the monopolist could make without having any customer information at all.
Competition
Now we consider the duopoly case when consumers can pay for privacy. The presentation here is similar to that in Section 3.2, although we incorporate (as in Section 4.1) an intermediate stage 2.5 at which consumers 25 When c = t, Proposition 4 leads to the no-privacy result with θ * 2 = 0.
can choose to pay for privacy. So the timing in this section likewise changes to accommodate consumers' actions.
We remark that if neither firm buys the information then the ability of consumers to pay for privacy does not alter the benchmark result derived in Section 3.2. Hence if consumers observe that no firm has information then no consumer will pay the cost c, and the resulting prices will be the standard Hotelling prices.
Both firm A and firm B have information
Consider the case where, at stage 2, both firms buy the consumer information. In this case, increased competition leads to tailored prices low enough that it makes no economic sense for any consumer to pay for privacy.
Lemma 1. If consumers observe that both firms purchased the information, then no consumer pays the privacy cost.
Proof. Take any subset of old consumers who did not pay the privacy cost. Competition in this subset is for every consumer, so the tailored prices are equivalent to those given in Proposition 1. The implication is that any consumer who prefers privacy does so for the resulting opportunity to pay only the basic price offered by the nearest firm-because the alternative (the tailored price) already matches the competitor's offer. The rest of the proof relies on the following two arguments.
If a consumerθ ∈ [0,
1 2 ] pays the privacy cost, then every consumer θ ∈ [0,θ] pays the privacy cost because utility is decreasing in the transportation cost tθ. By symmetry, a similar statement is true in
2. If a strictly positive mass of consumers pays the privacy cost, then p A and p B should be greater than t. Suppose consumers θ ∈ [0, θ A ] pay the privacy cost to hide from firm A. Then A solves
Firm B solves an analogous problem (where consumers θ ∈ [θ B , 1] pay the privacy cost); then prices
The first argument implies that consumers to the left of 1 2 would pay the privacy cost if and only if p A + c < t(1 − 2θ), and the second argument implies that p A > t. These two conditions cannot hold for c > 0, from which it follows that no consumer would pay the privacy cost.
In the personalized market, both firms will compete for every consumer and the tailored prices will be low. Therefore, consumers will pay the privacy cost only if basic prices are even lower than tailored prices (after accounting for the privacy cost c); but such basic prices are not profitable.
Note that, from the perspective of total welfare, we achieve an efficient allocation in this case: transportation costs are minimized (since market shares along both Hotelling lines are symmetric) and no consumer engages in wasteful activities (i.e., no one pays the privacy cost).
In sum: if consumers can pay for privacy and if information is distributed symmetrically between firms, then in equilibrium consumers do not pay for privacy. This means that consumers' entitlement to privacy has no effect on the outcome when both firms have information. Hence Proposition 1 still holds with Hotelling prices offered to new consumers and lower (personalized) prices offered to old consumers.
Only Firm A has information
As in Section 3.2.2, we assume that firm A buys the information and B does not. Some of the old consumers might pay the privacy cost to avoid the tailored price. The proportion of such customers-who prefer paying c so that they can buy from firm A at the basic rather than the tailored price-is given by
As in Section 4.1, this share must be based on anticipated prices because consumers make their privacy choices at stage 2.5 yet prices are not set until stages 3 and 4. In other words, by the time prices are set, firm A treats the proportion of consumers who paid the privacy cost as fixed. The indifferent consumer type is then given by
The equilibrium is given in the following result.
Proposition 5. Assume that only firm A buys the information and that consumers can pay for privacy.
Then there exists a thresholdc < t such that, if c ≤c, then the equilibrium consists of
, and θ 2 = 3(t − c) 8t ;
if c >c, then the equilibrium is as described in Proposition 2.
Proof. First we verify that firm B chooses a price such that it does not sell to old consumers (θ 
Note that the value if θ Prices under this scenario are higher than Hotelling prices for c ≤c. From firm A's perspective, the average willingness to pay in the segment [0, θ 2 ] is greater than the average willingness to pay of new consumers because the former are closer to A. It follows that the average willingness to pay in the anonymous market is greater than the average willingness to pay in a set comprising new consumers only; 26 hence p A ≥ t.
It is worth noting that the inequality p A ≥ p B results from the difference in the average willingness to pay for each product when no consumer in [0, θ 2 ] buys from firm B.
That the price p B is never less than t stems from B's finding it unprofitable to compete for old consumers; in other words, firm A supplies every old consumer. This means that θ 0 2 ≥ 1, which in turn implies that p B ≥ t. The change of regime atc is given by B's decision to sell to old consumers, 27 after which B's equilibrium profits are continuous atc. Yet, θ 2 is discontinuous atc, where it drops to 0 (i.e., no consumer pays for privacy).
Corollary 2. Assume that only firm A buys the information and that consumers can pay for privacy. Then 
27 Details are given in the proof of Proposition 5.
the profits of both firms are decreasing in c whereas consumer surplus is increasing in c.
Proof. If c ≤c, then profits and consumer surplus can be written as follows:
If c >c, then the equilibrium is the same as the one found in Proposition 2. We can show that π A (c), π B (c) < 0 because c < t and CS (c) > 0. In the proof of Proposition 5 we established that there is a thresholdc above which firm B poaches some old consumers from firm A, which leads to basic prices low enough that consumers do not pay for privacy; hence the equilibrium in Proposition 2 holds. Then profits and consumer surplus are linear in c >c. It follows that Corollary 2 holds for any c ≤ t.
Note first that, even when c is small, some consumers choose not to protect themselves. Indeed, they anticipate an intense competition for them, and the way to benefit from it is to leave public the information about them.
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Observe now that, as c increases, a smaller proportion of consumers pay the privacy cost. This dynamics reduces the average willingness to pay for A's product in the anonymous market. In response, A lowers its price and then B does the same (to continue competing for the new consumers) owing to strategic complementarity. Since p B decreases, it follows that the tailored price should also decrease because A must leave more surplus to the consumers-hence again they will have no incentive to buy from firm B. Thus the profits of both firms decline, which contrasts sharply with the monopoly case.
Of course, consumers benefit from this competition. We deduce from Corollary 2 that consumer surplus is always increasing in c because when c increases, all prices fall and the number of consumers who pay the privacy cost also declines. These two effects are more than enough to compensate for the consumers who pay a higher c. Furthermore, consumer surplus exhibits an upward jump atc because the firms compete more aggressively when B supplies old consumers as well.
We can also compute the privacy gains for old consumers close to A as the utility from paying for privacy 28 Even if this is not an option in our paper, these consumers would even be ready to pay for their information to be public.
minus the utility from not paying:
which is decreasing in c. Indeed, as c increases these consumers benefit from a lower price but suffer from the direct effect of an increased privacy cost-and that direct negative effect dominates the positive, pricemediated effect. So when the cost of privacy is higher consumers who protect their privacy are worse-off whereas all other consumers are better-off.
The price of information
The price of information when consumers can pay for privacy is calculated just as in Section 3.2.3. The data
supplier DS compares what it can obtain from selling to one firm, T 1 , with what it can obtain from selling the whole data set to both firms, 2T 2 . Proposition 6 shows that, even when consumers can pay for privacy, the DS finds it optimal to sell its consumer information to one firm only.
Proposition 6. If c ≤c, then information is sold to one firm at a price T = Our previous finding-that the data supplier prefers to sell its consumer information to just one firm-is therefore robust to introducing privacy. It is remarkable that the DS can set a higher price for information when the privacy cost is not too great. In fact, the informed firm (A) knows that if privacy is allowed (or if c is not too high) then it can charge higher prices because its customers have a higher average valuation (since only those consumers close to the informed firm will pay for privacy). As a result, competition is less intense and there are larger gains to be made when acquiring information exclusively. Hence the possibility of privacy reinforces the result that information, when sold in one block, should be allocated to only one firm.
Proposition 6 is at odds with Chen et al. (2001) , who postulate that a nonexclusive allocation can be optimal for the data seller. That could occur because price competition is not strong when targetability is sufficiently low, and firms set higher prices the more they mistake loyal customers from searches. The authors define privacy as the state prevailing when targetability is imperfect and firms cannot properly recognize their loyal customers; in that model, mistargeting occurs uniformly across consumers. In contrast, privacy (and hence targetability) in our model depends on the information structure and also on competition. That explains why we do not encounter cases with both a high level of privacy (low targetability) and nonexclusive sales of data.
Finally, given that T in Proposition 6 is U-shaped with respect to c, we can show that the corner solution c =c yields the highest revenue for the DS. 29 Furthermore, since T is minimized at c = t/9, it follows that the value of information is generally increasing in c because, when c > t/9, the outside option of not buying π B decreases more rapidly than do the profits π A generated from buying information.
To explain further this result, note that, since p A decreases more rapidly in c than does p B , it follows that B's market share among new consumers decreases with c. This, in turn, means that B's profits must decline when c increases. However, firm A encounters two effects in the new consumer segment: its market share increases with c even as its price decreases with c. Among old consumers, a larger privacy cost means that fewer consumers will pay for it, which increases the revenue from tailored prices despite the associated decline in p A (θ). At the same time, fewer of the old consumers pay the basic price; hence, A's (gross) profit is less sensitive to c than is B's profit.
Extensions and robustness checks
We now consider alternatives in the timing of the game, we envisioned different data selling strategies and we discuss the robustness of our results to changes in consumers' markets size.
Alternative timing
Ex-post privacy
We modify the timing of the game so that consumers can pay for privacy after both basic and tailored prices have been set by the firms. Therefore, consumers observe all prices before deciding whether to acquire privacy and prior to consumption. In turn, firms cannot alter their prices after consumers have made their privacy choices. This change of timing is relevant when consumers could have access to all prices, but at a cost.
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This extension shows that our main message carries through. To see why, first consider a case where only firm A has data and letp A (θ) be the tailored price. The choice of this price is constrained by two elements.
First, the consumers may pay for privacy to avoid paying the tailored price so the following constraint should hold:
29 Setting the cost of privacy abovec would result in a regime whereby no consumer opts for privacy (since it is too costly); in that case, information's competitive value would be lower.
30 For instance, for online grocery shopping, introductory offers are available to all consumers, old and new, but to benefit from them, old consumers would have to create a new profile -a time-consuming action -and they would lose the benefit of predefined personalized baskets.
Second, firm A must make sure that old consumers prefer its tailored price to the offer of firm B. This means that the tailored price cannot be greater than p A (θ), as defined in section 3.2.2. Because of this dual constraint, the tailored price firm A chooses for old consumers is given bỹ
This implies that firm A sets a tailored price of p A + c for consumers with types θ < θ 2 , as defined in the baseline model. These consumers are now indifferent between paying the privacy cost and facing the nontailored price or paying the tailored price, but the latter option is more profitable for the firm. Therefore, A's profits are now
In this version of the model, firm A can effectively condition three prices: p A +c for high-value old customers, p A for new consumers, and p A (θ) for old consumers who may be attracted to the competitor's offer. It is immediate to show that Firm A's reaction function derived from π A is the same as the one obtained in the main model. 31 As firm
As regard firm B's pricing incentives, they remain unchanged in this new timing because the consumers indifferent between buying from firm A and from B are the same as the one derived with the initial timing.
We then obtain the same reaction function for firm B as in Section 4.2.2. The reaction functions being the same for both firms, results are unchanged when the privacy decision is ex-post. The only difference is that no consumer pays for privacy in equilibrium and A's profits (as well as the price of the data) increase by c × θ * 2 .
Interim sales of information
So far we have assumed that the data supplier sells the information ex ante at a price T set at stage 1. This selling strategy presupposes some strong commitment ability on the part of the DS, which may actually prefer to retain some pricing flexibility when selling its dataset to the retail firms. For this reason, we now consider the possibility that data sales could be made at a later stage of the game. More precisely, we consider the case in which the firms buy information after consumers have decided whether or not to pay the privacy cost (but still before the pricing game). We remark that if the sale of information occurs after basic prices are set, then all consumers can benefit from the basic price at no cost and so consumer information 31 This can be understood by looking at the the expression for the profit π A . We focus on the first two terms that reflect the old consumers' market. For these consumers, the net extensive margin effect of varying p A cancels out because, when p A increases, the same share of consumers who do not pay p A + c start paying p A (θ). The only effect that remains, as far as the old consumers are concerned, is the one on the intensive margin. And when added to the impact on the new consumers' market, it generates the same reaction function as in the main model. has no value.
32 In this extension, we concentrate on the range of privacy costs c ≤c to avoid any change of regime.
The timing here still observes the basic sequence described in Section 3.1. But in contrast to Section 4.2, consumers make their privacy decision at the very start of the game-at a stage that we denote as 0.5, so that the information dataset is no longer sold ex ante:
Stage 0.5. Consumers make their privacy choice; that is, they decide whether or not to pay the cost c.
In this section, consumers must decide about paying the privacy cost before they know which firm will be making the targeted offers. Therefore, not only firms A and B, but also-and more importantly-the data supplier, itself may wish to deviate from the actions anticipated by consumers. In light of this possibility, the next lemma shows that information cannot be sold to both firms simultaneously and also that the structure of exclusive sales should differ from the structure characterized in Section 4.2.3.
Lemma 2. If consumers must decide about paying the privacy cost before knowing which firm will be informed, then there is no equilibrium in which information is sold to only one firm with certainty or in which information is sold to both firms with certainty.
Proof. See Appendix B (online)
An equilibrium could arise if the DS randomized its selected buyer of information and charged a price such that the chosen firm is indifferent between buying or not buying.
Proposition 7. There exists an equilibrium in which information is sold exclusively to each firm with probability 1 2 and where the price of that information is
Proof. See Appendix B (online).
The result concerning exclusivity of purchased information is therefore robust to changes in the baseline model's timing-in particular, if we consider ex post rather than ex ante exclusivity. Furthermore, we can observe by comparing the results of Proposition 6 and Proposition 7 that the data supplier would like to commit ex ante for small values of c but would rather sell later for a large c (see Figure 2 where we plot the price of information with and without commitment, and the threshold c * below which the DS prefers to commit).
32 If the basic prices are set before the information is bought by the firm(s) but are not publicly announced to the anonymous market until after the information is bought, then the equilibrium is the same as the one derived in this section.
One can understand this result by recalling that without commitment and for low c, nearly all old consumers will pay the privacy cost and so the data supplier has almost nothing to sell. With commitment, however, some consumers choose not to pay even a low privacy cost; firms compete strongly for these customers because in this case the basic price is high (and so their outside options are limited). Now suppose the privacy cost is high. Without commitment, no consumer decides to pay this cost because his preferred firm will have some information about him only with probability 1/2; hence the competition for information is intense and so the data supplier's price is high. With commitment, there may be more consumers paying for privacy as well as less competition for information. 
Alternative data selling strategies
Here we discuss alternative ways in which the data supplier might contract with the retailers. First, we consider a case where the DS can create two independent data segments. By doing so, he can sell the whole data set while ensuring that firms do not propose personalized prices to the same consumers. In the second part of this section we study whether the DS can profit from reducing the quality of the data that are offered to the firms. More precisely, we assume that the DS can sell datasets with different qualities, one with perfect information and another that only gives a signal on whether the consumer's type is below or above a threshold.
Data segmentation
Suppose that the DS segments the data in two halves and offers the subset 
where the max{.} in (5) captures the fact that firm i could reduce its basic price and sell to some of the private consumers in its competitor's turf.
Given that the data is equally divided between the firms and old consumers at both ends of the distribution exhibit the same behavior, any equilibrium has to be symmetric, i.e, θ i = θ j . Therefore, it must be that
> θ i . Then, it can be shown that equilibrium prices are p i = p j = t(1 + 2θ i ), where θ i is common to both firms and depends on the value of c. It remains to verify that firms do not deviate from this equilibrium during the pricing stage. Such deviation would require a sufficiently large reduction in price such that a firm can sell to private consumers located closer to its competitor. We establish in the next Lemma a condition under which that is not the case.
Lemma 3. There exists a thresholdc = t 2 (2 − √ 2) <c such that, for c ≥c, firms do not deviate.
Proof. See Appendix B (online).
This result can be interpreted as follows. When c is large there are fewer private consumers. If this is the case, a significant reduction in the basic price is required to sell to consumers closer to the rival, which is not profitable. Then, for c ≥c, it can be shown that equilibrium profits are
Let us assume that the DS can offer the whole data set to the rival when a firm refuses to buy its share of the data. 34 Therefore, a firm that refuses to buy the data makes profits π B in Corollary 2 and the DS generates revenue
which exceeds the broker's revenue in the baseline model.
This example show that one has to qualify our main result on exclusivity as it may not apply to the whole dataset but only to part of it. At the same time, the result of this example hinges critically on the assumption that the DS can perfectly and at no cost determine which segment of the data is most profitable for each firm, which may not be realistic. One can also believe that, by splitting the dataset, the information each firm can extract from its part is reduced.
Data quality
We consider now the possibility that the data supplier sells not only the fully informative dataset to firm A but also another dataset, less precise, to firm B. This additional dataset would give firm B a signal on whether the old consumer's type is above of below σ with σ ∈ [1/2, 1].
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If we compare this situation with the benchmark case, B can now set three prices instead of two : p B for the anonymous market; p B for the old consumers with type less that σ; p B for the old consumers with type greater than σ. As far as the old consumers are concerned, it is as if there were three submarkets: one with consumers in [0, 1/2), another with consumers in [1/2, σ) and the last with consumers in [σ, 1] . Regarding the first submarket, because consumers are closer to firm A than firm B, firm A will always be able to tailor its price sufficiently to serve all consumers. The last submarket (made of consumers with types in [σ, 1]) can be totally captured by firm B if σ is close enough to 1 but may also be contested by firm A when σ is not too large. This depends on whether σ is greater or smaller than 3/4. As for the intermediate submarket made of consumers with type between 1/2 and σ, it is divided between the two firms and the price paid by these consumers increases with σ.
This new informational structure also affects the old consumers' decision to pay the privacy cost. We can show that, for any value of the privacy cost or of the signal σ, no consumer close to firm B chooses to pay the privacy cost. Indeed, on the anonymous market, the price is at least equal to t, and because of the privacy cost, the total cost born is at least t + c. The price paid by the old consumers on the other market -when they do not hide -reflects competition between firm A and firm B. If firm B wants to get at least some old consumers, and be able to compete with the most aggressive offers from firm A, it must set a price less than t. So no consumers on firm B's turf will ever have any incentive to hide, a result that echoes Lemma 1. On the contrary, it may be in the interest of some consumers located to the left of the line to pay the privacy cost to hide. Indeed, since B has only an imprecise information about consumers located on firm A's turf, it cannot exert a strong competitive pressure on tailored price set by firm A. As these prices remain high, some consumers close to 0 may still find it profitable to hide from A and buy on the anonymous market, 35 In Appendix B (online) we fully characterize the equilibrium in this case so here we will focus on explaining the main intuitions.
at least when the privacy is cost is not too large. In the Appendix, we build on these results to prove the following lemma.
Lemma 4. Assume that the data supplier sells a dataset disclosing full information to firm A and a less precise dataset to firm B, who only learns if the type of each (old) individual is above or below σ ∈ [1/2, 1].
If the data supplier can choose the optimal level of precision, it will choose σ = 1 in order to maximize its revenues from the sale of information.
The revenues earned by the data supplier depend on the profits earned by the two firms. From firm A's point of view, the optimal level of σ is 1 since it is this value that preserves the most its comparative advantage.
36 From Firm B's point of view, the optimal precision should be between 1/2 and 1. Indeed, when σ = 1/2, the information learnt by firm B does not allow it to improve its offer on the consumers located to the left -Firm A's can always undercut any positive price with a profitable offer -and not much on the right -these consumers are heterogenous so the value of the information is low. Similarly, when σ = 1, the signal only tells firm B who is an old and who is a new consumer but this is not helpful to screen old consumers.
On the contrary, when the signal is intermediate, it allows firms B to make specific offers to the two groups of consumers, depending on whether they are almost captive (located close to 1) or potentially attracted to firm A (when they are close to 1/2). But any information given to firm B affects the way competition occurs between the two firms. In particular, when σ increases, the price set for the old consumers increases so more people pay the privacy cost. This leads to a price increase on the anonymous market which benefits all firms, and allows the data supplier to increase the price at which the information is sold to both firms.
One can now compare the revenues earned by the data supplier when a second albeit imprecise dataset is sold to firm B to the revenues of the benchmark case when only firm A benefits from information about consumers. When firm B only knows who is old and new, and this is the case when it buys the least precise dataset, any offer it could make would be matched by a tailored offer made by firm A for any consumer with type between 0 and 1/2. Therefore firm B will only consider consumers with type greater than 1/2, which leads it to set a price equal to t/2. But there was no effective competition for these consumers in the benchmark case, they were all buying from A, so the revenues gained by firm A are greater than when firm B has also some information about consumers. This explains why the revenues the data supplier can generate are greater when the information is sold to firm A only than when some additional information is sold to the other firm.
Proposition 8. The data seller's profits are greater when it sells the full dataset to one firm only rather than selling a additional imperfect dataset to the other firm competing on the same market.
The results of this subsection confirm that the data supplier has an interest in creating competitive differences between downstream firms. Conditional on selling the dataset to both firms, the DS tries to make one as noisy as possible but it is even more profitable to go one step further and grant full exclusivity.
Markets of different sizes
Until now we have assumed that there are as many old consumers as new ones. We have shown that, in the asymmetric scenarios when only one firm has information about customers, the other firm would prefer not to compete in the market for old consumers (which is therefore left entirely to its informed rival). One may therefore wonder the extent to which this result depends on having two markets of identical sizes. In this section we generalize the analysis by allowing the mass of new consumers to be of any size m > 0 (while still assuming a unit mass of old consumers). Thus we explore the effect of changing the relative market size on the incentives to acquire information in the presence of privacy. In this endeavor we assume that c ≤ t(3m+3) 3m+4 < t so that some consumers pay for privacy in every case (as shown in what follows, this condition ensures that θ 2 ≥ 0).
With regards to the equilibrium, the main effect of varying m is to change firm B's incentives to compete for old consumers. Recall that doing so requires B to set a low price (lower than t) because it is disadvantaged when competing with A, which has purchased information about consumers. Moreover, B can set only one price for both markets. So if m is large, then it is more profitable for B to set a higher price and compete only for new consumers. Conversely, if m is small then forsaking old consumers will not be profitable.
Lemma 5. Assume that only firm A buys the information and that consumers can pay for privacy. Then there are two types of equilibria, as described next.
(i) If B does not compete for old consumers, then
(ii) If B does compete for old consumers, then
; θ 2 = 3m(m + 1)(t − c) − cm 2(m + 1)(3m + 2)t .
Prices are decreasing in m when firm B does not compete for old consumers. As m continues to increase, prices converge to the Hotelling prices. Indeed, as the market for new consumers becomes relatively more important, firms focus increasingly on that market and the situation is akin to a standard Hotelling competition. When B competes for old consumers, the effect of the relative size m on prices is more ambiguous.
Lemma 6. Suppose once again that only firm A buys the information and that consumers can pay for privacy. Under these conditions there exists an m * (c) > 0, such that B does not compete for old consumers if and only if m ≥ m * (c).
We can now predict the data supplier's behavior for any m > 0. Lemma 4 gives us two cases to analyze: one is which m is greater than and one in which it is less than m * (c). By Lemma 1 (which can be generalized to any m > 0), if both firms buy information then consumers do not pay for privacy. It follows from Proposition 1 that firms make equal profits from selling to either set of consumers-that is, mt/2 for new consumers and t/4 for old consumers.
Proposition 9. For any m > 0, it is always more profitable for the data supplier to sell the information to only one firm.
Hence we may conclude that, whereas firm B's decision to compete for old consumers depends on the respective sizes of the two markets, the data supplier's optimal selling strategy does not. Proposition 8
implies that the DS's preference for exclusivity in the allocation of information is robust to any market size-provided that information is sold ex ante.
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A similar result also arises in a related extension, where the tracking technology that reveals information about consumers is not perfect (as we have, until now, assumed it to be). As the tracking technology becomes less perfect, profits become more dependent on the anonymous market (for which information is not available); the effect is similar to that of an increase in the mass of new consumers. Exclusivity also arises in this case.
6 Main highlights and final remarks
Big Data enable firms to approach consumers via three types of targeted offers: targeted advertisements, customized products, and tailored prices. In this paper, we have focused on prices. 39 The novelty of our 37 When m < m * (c), the results of Corollary 2 are preserved for sufficiently small values of the privacy cost.
38 See Appendix C (online) for the details that make this informal argument more precise. 39 We could easily have modeled product customization by making the firm offer type-θ consumers a good that generates gross utility v + θt at a cost to the firm of θx, where 0 < x < t. In this case, the data supplier would appropriate any efficiency gains and still prefer exclusivity; neither the uninformed firm's profits nor consumer surplus would change. In addition, if one firm is more efficient than its rival at tailoring goods then the DS always sells to the more efficient firm. approach is in allowing consumers to respond to the possibility of being targeted. We have also explored the previously unstudied aspect of the data owner's selling strategy. Our model can be used to answer two important policy and managerial questions, one related to the value of privacy for consumers and one to the value of information for firms.
With regard to the value of privacy, a current debate concerns the effect of restricting how commercial firms use information. If increasing restrictions are reasonably proxied by reductions in the privacy cost, then our study indicates that one must distinguish between the case of monopoly and the case of more competitive market structures. In the monopoly case, making it easier for consumers to protect their privacy has an ambiguous effect on consumers: some gain while others lose. Using a utilitarian social welfare function that weighs consumer surplus and firm profits equally also leads to ambiguous results-even though the presumption is then stronger that society is worse-off when privacy costs are low. The results are less ambiguous under duopoly: total consumer surplus increases with the privacy cost and total welfare is maximized when consumers cannot protect their data. However, if consumers do protect their data (i.e., when with c <c), then welfare is U-shaped with respect to c. So from a social welfare perspective, it would make sense to promote either a little or a lot of protection because intermediate levels are suboptimal. As for the second key managerial question, one may be interested in computing the value of informationfor the retail firm purchasing the consumer data or, equivalently, for the data supplier. This value depends on the strategy chosen by the DS, so the question could alternatively be phrased in terms of a study on the data supplier's optimal selling strategy. We establish that such strategy consists of creating strong competition between the firms to acquire information. As mentioned previously, competing for information can be analyzed as an auction (with externalities) in which each firm's payoff is affected by the final informational structure. The best way to generate high information value is to increase the difference between the firm's profits when only it has the information and when it has no information. When the information must be sold in one block, achieving this goal requires that the information be sold to one exclusive buyer. Figure 5 plots the price for data in the monopoly case (when the exclusivity strategy is not available) and also in the duopoly case when the data supplier sells to only one of the competing firms. Even when profits are greater in the monopoly than in the duopoly case, for every c we observe that the price of data under a competitive duopoly (T COM ) is higher than its price under a single-firm monopoly (T MON ). These prices are computed while considering the differential effects of information on profit; as shown in Figure 6 , the impact is greater in the duopoly case. This result illustrates the notion that, for the data supplier it is optimal to maximize 40 Recall that efficiency in our model is reached when market shares along both Hotelling lines are shared equally by the firms (under competition) and when consumers do not spend their resources on privacy. The other variables in the model (e.g., consumer prices, the information price) are simply transfers that affect individual payoffs but not overall welfare. It is nevertheless important to realize that the exclusivity result does not mean that a whole information set cannot be divided, and sold in pieces. If the supplier's cost of partitioning the data is small enough, and if each submarket is profitable on its own, it may be optimal to create some local informational monopolies and divide the whole data set into different data sets. What seems to be robust though is the fact that the information related to any given individual should only be sold once to maximize the supplier's profit. The question of identifying the optimal partition of data under more general conditions is an interesting one that is left for future research.
It would be illuminating to know more about the exclusivity deals offered by data suppliers, but many details about such transactions are relatively less visible to researchers. Our model predicts that exclusivity should be offered to one firm in a competing market-for example, one local restaurant or one manufacturer of training shoes. This empirical implication of our results could be tested with suitable data.
Our finding about exclusivity also bears important policy implications. The FTC (2016) recently published a report detailing the benefits and risks created by the use of Big Data analytics. This publication is part of a conversation that the agency pursues with experts to address, by way of economic reasoning and empirical evidence, the possible downsides of Big Data. Although most acknowledges the great potential for efficiency gains from the data revolution, areas of concern include the size of the players involved and the insufficient transparency of many deals (FTC, 2014) . Influential antitrust scholars have begun to discuss how c 3t-v t significant effects of particular conduct or transactions (e.g., exclusivity deals considered in this paper) may manifest in the market for data though not in the market for final goods and services. Therefore, a focus on customer data can reveal competitive effects that have consequences for final consumers (Shelanski, 2013) .
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As a related example of prominence of customer information, we mention the 2016 acquisition of LinkedInthe largest provider of social networking services for professionals-by Microsoft for $26.2 in cash. Microsoft managed to beat Salesforce in a fierce bidding battle during the acquisition process. Both Microsoft and Salesforce are active in the market for customer relationship management (CRM). Both companies believed that LinkedIn database of profiles could be coupled with CRM systems. When Microsoft won, Salesforce complained that after the merger, Microsoft will have the ability and the incentive to refuse access to LinkedIn data to its CRM competitor. This example shows that LinkedIn chose to sell itself exclusively to a single buyer rather than sharing its dataset with multiple downstream firms.
Finally, we draw a clear policy recommendation concerning privacy and price discrimination. In our model, policy makers have two tools: a fairly standard one that makes privacy more or less costly; and the oversight of exclusive data arrangements. We find that regulators should promote a non-exclusive allocation of consumer data across competing firms. However, if only one firm has consumer data then regulators 41 As a further example of active policy interest in this area, the competition authorities of Germany (Bundeskartellamt) and of France (Autorité de la Concurrence) published in May 2016 a joint report on Big Data; this report looked at the potential effects of collecting large sets of users' personal data on competition in digital markets. See "Competition Law and Data", available at http://www.autoritedelaconcurrence.fr/doc/reportcompetitionlawanddatafinal.pdf.
should probably not advocate for easier privacy. 42 Furthermore, an asymmetric allocation of information is doubly inefficient in our model because it induces not only inefficient consumption patterns (oversupply from firm A in both markets) but also wasteful privacy expenditures by consumers. So despite regulation's initial concern with price discrimination, its focus should be re-directed toward how information is transactedbut not toward facilitating consumer privacy. However, not much is known to the community of researchers about how contracts are written between data suppliers and final data users. In the absence of good empirical evidence, we hope that a theoretical setting like the one presented in this paper can raise awareness about the issues at stake in this important field and spur further research on the topic.
Consider any equilibrium candidate with p B > 0. For any p I (θ, p B ), firm B could deviate and set p B − ε.
Then, by assumption, old consumers are no longer indifferent and now buy from B. The term ε needs to be small enough that B's losses from selling to new consumers do not offset its gains from deviating, yet such an ε always exists.
Consider now a candidate equilibrium with p B = 0, which implies that B's profit is zero. In that case, p A = (2t − c)/3. Yet this cannot be an equilibrium because B would then rather choose p B > 0 so as to maximize its profit on the anonymous market only. Therefore, firm B's best reaction is to set p B = (5t−c)/6; in which case it makes a strictly positive profit. Hence for any candidate pure-strategy equilibrium there exists a profitable deviation for firm B. We conclude that there can be no equilibrium in pure strategies when prices are chosen simultaneously.
